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Abstract--Unique and varied power system conditions are 
already being experienced as a result of the deployment of novel 
control strategies and new generation and distribution related 
technologies driven by the smart grid. A particular challenge is 
related to ensuring the correct and reliable operation of 
protection schemes. Implementing smarter protection in the form 
of adaptive setting selection is one way of tackling some of the 
protection performance issues. However, introducing such new 
approaches especially to safety critical systems such as protection 
carries an element of risk. Furthermore, integrating new 
secondary systems into the substation is a complex and costly 
procedure. To this end, this paper proposes an adaptive 
protection architecture that facilitates the integration of such 
schemes into modern digital substations which are a staple of 
smart grids. Functional features of the architecture also offer 
powerful means of de-risking schemes and flexible 
implementation through self-contained modules that are suitable 
for reuse. An example adaptive distance protection scheme is 
presented and tested to demonstrate how the architecture can be 
implemented and to highlight the architectures novel features. 
 
Index Terms--Adaptive relaying, smart grids, scheme 
architecture and real-time digital simulation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HORTFALLS in power system protection performance 
are being experienced at both transmission and distribution 
networks. These are due to a number of factors including 
increased penetration of distributed generation, varied 
operational conditions and severe wide area disturbances [1-
3]. Maintaining acceptable protection performance is essential 
for a functional smart grid as these schemes ensure the reliable 
and safe operation of the primary system. Adaptive protection 
(whether using settings groups or more advanced setting 
calculation techniques) has been proposed as a solution to 
enhancing the performance of protection schemes in response 
to many of these factors [4]. However, a body of work 
tackling adaptive protection schemes from an architectural 
point of view and ultimately the verification and validation 
(V&V) of such schemes is virtually non-existent. 
This paper proposes a unique requirements-driven adaptive 
protection architecture. Devising such an architecture not only 
defines the constituents of an effective adaptive protection 
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scheme, but it is instrumental in delivering straightforward 
substation integration and effective scheme V&V. This 
architecture and its constituent functions aim to contribute to 
the set of tools and approaches that form a toolbox of proven 
technical solutions for the smart grid [5], [6]. As 
communications system become more widespread and a 
cornerstone of delivering smart grid functions [7], emerging 
protection technologies (including adaptive protection) must 
effectively make use of these communications systems while 
maintaining reliable operation and interoperability between 
different vendor solutions. 
The fact that adaptive protection essentially relies on 
modifying its behavior based on the prevailing power system 
conditions [8] raises a number of concerns related to the 
validity of adaptive behavior, the nature and amount of 
information required to infer the system state and the 
appropriate scheme performance at any given time. These 
issues compared to conventional protection philosophies, 
present a challenge in terms of devising suitable scheme 
implementations and V&V procedures. The work in [9] 
highlights the importance of dedicated testing environments 
as an effective means of tackling this issue which requires 
considering the impact of varied primary system operational 
conditions dictated by smart grid controls. 
This paper first of all discusses the different life-cycle 
stages of a protection scheme or platform from the point of 
view of utilities and manufacturers respectively. This is 
critical to understanding the requirements necessary to 
develop an adaptive protection solution that meets the utilities 
expectations while not leading to a costly and impractical 
overhaul of secondary substation infrastructure. In light of 
these requirements, the paper then develops the proposed 
architecture with its distinct functional layers. Detailed 
architecture functionality is also discussed. Challenges of 
integrating adaptive protection schemes into modern 
substations are identified and the role of the architecture in 
overcoming these is discussed. 
Finally the V&V of adaptive protection schemes, although 
not the focus of this paper, is an important issue that needs to 
be addressed. Some of the challenges associated with this are 
discussed and the inherent architectural features that facilitate 
scheme verification and validation are explained. Furthermore, 
an example adaptive distance protection scheme is presented 
to illustrate the validation process and demonstrate how the 
architecture can be physically implemented. 
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 B.  Adaptive Scheme Functional Requirements 
Figure 2 shows a simplified functional flow of a generic 
adaptive protection scheme in order to achieve a suitable 
setting in response to a system event. Four main functions 
have been identified in order to deliver this at acceptable 
performance levels. These are: power system event detection 
and qualification, post-event evaluation of protection 
performance and post-event setting calculation and 
application. 
 
 
Figure 2 Generic adaptive protection scheme operation 
 
Events that have a potentially negative impact on the 
performance of a protection scheme must be detected through 
means of local or remote measurements or both. It is also 
necessary to qualify the extent of the event which is necessary 
to conduct the performance evaluation. Evaluating the 
performance of the protection scheme post-event is essential 
to ascertain the suitability of the applied settings. This 
function does not need to be conducted in real-time. It may be 
deemed sufficient to qualify the performance of the protection 
scheme under various operational events during the design 
stage which is then hardwired into the adaptive scheme. 
Should post-event scheme performance prove unsatisfactory 
after the evaluation process, a new setting is selected or 
calculated and then made active such that the scheme 
performance is brought to levels as specified by the original 
requirements outlined in the utility protection policy. 
C.  Adaptive Scheme User Requirements 
Detailed functional requirements are highly dependent on 
the scheme in question and the application network. However, 
these serve to deliver on user requirements. The following is a 
brief list of the main user requirements that an adaptive 
protection scheme must adhere to. These should be 
measureable in such a way that they can be verified at 
different stage of scheme development: 
? Utilization of existing protection functions: the essence 
of adaptive protection functionality is altering the 
configuration of existing schemes (setting or scheme 
logic) in order to enhance their performance. For 
instance, a distance scheme can be complemented with 
overarching adaptive functions that improve its 
sensitivity to in-zone faults through reach alteration. 
? Primary system conditions that sanction adaptive 
behavior: as adaptive protection scheme do not offer a fit 
for all solution, it is necessary to define the events that 
instigate adaptive functionality and the nature of the 
required response. For instance, changing the topology of 
a distribution network may require the regarding of 
overcurrent protection. Information about the new 
topology and its onset is therefore required. 
? Ease of integration with existing substation 
infrastructure: practical constraints posed by brown field 
sites and established protection practices require that 
adaptive schemes make most use of existing IEDs, 
computing and communications equipment. This 
manages risk of new technology as systems are 
decoupled and new technology introduced is limited to 
the adaptive functions as opposed to additional 
supporting infrastructure. 
? Minimum performance levels met by adaptive schemes: 
since these schemes are meant to alleviate performance 
shortfalls of existing schemes, they must satisfy 
minimum performance levels set by utility policy. 
Furthermore, any single failure mode of the adaptive 
scheme must not cause the any further deterioration of 
existing protection functions. 
?  Standard interfaces for scheme configuration and 
diagnostics: adaptive protection schemes should remain 
faithful to the staple protection settings and scheme logic 
used for configuring expected scheme behavior. 
Furthermore signals that reflect adaptive behavior should 
be logged alongside disturbance records used to for post-
event diagnostics. Information models adopted by the 
scheme should also adhere to common substation 
standards (e.g. IEC 61850). 
All of the requirements developed above are fed in to the 
design process of the adaptive protection architecture 
proposed in following section. This aims to tackle some of the 
integration challenges of such new technologies and reduce 
their associated risks of their adoption. 
III.  ADAPTIVE PROTECTION ARCHITECTURE 
One of the first and most critical steps in realizing an 
adaptive protection scheme is the design of a representative 
and functional architecture which reflects the developed 
requirements. This is an effective means of managing smart 
grid complexity through structural rigor [10]. The architecture 
will be referred to hereafter as the Adaptive Protection 
Architecture (APA). The APA serves the purpose of defining 
scheme elements connectivity, their interface and the scope of 
their operation. Furthermore, there are functions that the 
architecture delivers that are thought to be important to any 
adaptive scheme implementation. This greatly enhances 
technology maturity (de-risking) through components reuse. 
The proposed APA features three distinct functional layers 
(execution, coordination and management), as shown in 
Figure 3. This architecture assumes a functionally abstract 
form which de-emphasizes physical implementation. This 
allows flexibility in mapping any of the functions to suitable 
physical devices and platforms without sacrificing 
functionality which is an important feature when tackling 
substation integration challenges. 
 Figure 3 Adaptive protection architect
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Figure 4 Detailed functional interactions at the coordination layer 
 
There are three main functions that reside at the 
management layer, all of which operate with system wide 
protection and primary system performance in mind. These 
are: contextual system evaluation, protection action and 
protection diagnostics. Information provided by phasor 
measurement units (PMU), for instance, can be used by the 
contextual system evaluation function to determine the onset 
of system instability, cascade trips or major changes in power 
flows due to intermittent energy resources. This information is 
then utilized by the protection action function. For example, in 
response to the onset of cascade trips, low frequency demand 
disconnection can be targeted to operate more optimally in the 
network area(s) closer to the frequency deviations. This can 
only be achieved with wider system visibility offered at the 
management layer level. Another example is related to system 
restoration conditions where protection schemes can act 
against the operator [14]. Protection action functions can 
disable adaptive behavior or set limits for the underlying 
schemes such that they are desensitized to non-fault 
phenomena during the restoration process. Finally the 
diagnostics function operates in a similar manner to that of the 
performance evaluation function but without direct 
intervention. Alarms are raised for system operator action. 
Global logs of the adaptive behavior can also be kept for post-
event analysis. Communications between the substation and 
regional/national control rooms plays an important role 
enabling these functions. 
The gateway serves the purpose of providing standard 
communications interfaces so that different scheme elements 
can be integrated more easily within the substation. Plant 
status information and setting change requests normally pass 
through the gateway. Physically this can be existing substation 
gateways or protocol converters. 
C.  Centralized vs. Distributed Functionality 
Since the APA is functionally abstract, implementing a 
physical scheme layout is a straightforward process of 
mapping functions onto physical devices. However, there are 
some unique physical implementation challenges from the 
view point of centralized and distributed layouts. Distributed 
functions pose a challenge since functions may need to be split 
over physical devices. Duplicating functions over several 
devices can be one way of tackling this challenge. However, 
there needs to be a coordinating authority through which a 
final adaptive setting selection decision is sanctioned. 
To this end there are some functions that are suited to a 
certain physical layout as opposed to others. For instance, 
coordination functions that determine the system state and 
gather active setting indications from different relays are more 
suited to a centralized physical implementation. Conversely, 
active setting verification can be a distributed function, such 
that IEDs can verify whether they comply with the setting 
selection command and can raise a setting violation alarm if 
not. 
IV.  SUBSTATION INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS 
Considerations must be made for the communications 
system integration of adaptive protection schemes which 
constitutes several functional elements that can be from 
different vendors and can use different communication 
protocols. This challenge is being addressed by the 
development of substation communication gateways which 
can handle most of the commercial communication standards, 
including IEC 61850. The adaptive protection scheme can be 
implemented to use existing substation communication 
infrastructure. For example, coordination layer functions can 
monitor the system and change the protection settings through 
the communication gateway. To activate different settings 
groups using IEC 61850 requires writing to the SGCB control 
block over the LAN [15]. 
The proposed APA allows avoiding a major overhaul in 
existing substation secondary systems and infrastructure 
because of its flexibility, extensibility and role in de-risking 
novel protection functionality. These are features that are 
important in achieving delivering demanding performance 
constraints driven by smart grids [16]. Flexibility is 
manifested by the functional abstraction. Lack of physical 
constraints makes adaptive scheme implementation flexible in 
terms of solution offered by functions vendors and the 
enabling of function interoperability. Furthermore, flexibility 
is also a feature of smart grids which means that any adaptive 
protection architecture for smart grid applications must exhibit 
a level of flexibility. The architecture is also extensible such 
that additional functionality can be added without affecting the 
core performance of the scheme due to standalone modules. 
Finally, the APA play an important role of de-risking the 
adaptive protection functions by promoting reuse which is 
enabled, once again, through the functional abstraction. 
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